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I. THE SOURCE OF THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The union's duty of fair representation arises out of the col-
lective bargaining relationship. It concerns the manner in which the
union deals with the employer on behalf of those employees for whom
the union is the bargaining agent. For analytical purposes, fair repre-
sentation in collective bargaining can thus be distinguished from equi-
table treatment by the union of its members or of applicants for mem-
bership, although it is obvious that instances of hostile discrimination
in both collective bargaining and the conduct of internal union affairs
frequently have a common origin.
The nature of the union's duty of fair representation, which has
been the subject of so much scholarly investigation and analysis in
recent years, did not formerly assume such importance. So long as
unions bargained only for their own members, charges of unfair repre-
sentation were seldom brought to the attention of the public, and only
a few students of the then esoteric subject of internal union govern-
ment paid much attention to them. Courts, too, were generally disin-
clined to interfere in matters which they regarded as essentially private
disputes between unincorporated voluntary associations and their
members.'
This state of affairs was fundamentally and irreversibly changed,
however, by the enactment in 1935 of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), which provided, among other things, that collective
bargaining representatives designated or selected by the majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit were to be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit.2 Employers thereby
became subject to the affirmative duty to bargain collectively with the
majority union, as well as to the negative duty to refrain from bar-
gaining with representatives of minority unions; 3 nor could they evade
these obligations by negotiating employment contracts with individual
employees.4
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of
California, Los Angeles.
I The reasons for this reluctance are explained in Chafee, "The Internal Affairs of
Associations Not for Profit," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930).
2 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
3 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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Under the new arrangement, therefore, large numbers of workers
came to be represented in collective bargaining by unions which they
had not chosen and, possibly, did not wish to support. Although the
exclusive bargaining authority vested in unions was theoretically bal-
anced by a corresponding duty to represent all employees in the ap-
propriate unit fairly, and to refrain from hostile discrimination against
any of them,5 the authority turned out to be far more easily enforce-
able than the duty. This was true partly because the whole thrust of
the Wagner Act's enforcement machinery was directed at employers,
whose resistance to unionism in the thirties presented the chief ob-
stacle to effectuation of the national labor policy, and partly because
the more common types of unfair discrimination by unions in their
representation of nonmembers or of dissident members were usually
covert and difficult to prove. If an employer tried to undermine the
majority union's status by making private agreements with individual
employees6 or by bargaining with a minority union,7 he could readily
be compelled to cease and desist from continuing such activities. If, on
the other hand, a union informally adopted the policy of never pro-
testing a breach by management of the seniority provisions of the col-
lective agreement when the violation favored a union member against
a nonmember, and of always protesting in a reverse situation, the like-
lihood that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board would take notice of the practice
or do anything about it was extremely remote.
Even some of the more flagrant discriminatory practices of unions
against employees whom they were obligated to represent seemed to
be relatively immune to remedial action by administrative agencies or
the courts. Chief among such practices, of course, was the refusal to
admit Negroes or members of other minority groups into membership
on the same basis as all other members,' and the companion practice,
especially of the railroads, of negotiating with employers collective
agreements containing provisions that discriminated against Negroes.'
A less publicized but equally bald form of discrimination against all
nonunion members in the bargaining unit was that accomplished by
means of a system of "joint wage review," which prevailed for a time
in parts of the Southern California aircraft industry. Under that sys-
5 See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); cf. Steele v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
7 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th -Cir. 1945).
8 Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro (1944); Summers, "Admission Policies
of Labor Unions," 61 Q.J. Econ. 66 (1946).
9 See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., supra note 5.
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tem periodic merit increases could be awarded only by majority vote
of a review board composed of equal numbers of employer and union
representatives. Merit increases to nonunion employees were fre-
quently vetoed by the union representatives on the board, the laconic
explanation "for the record" being that they were "uncooperative."
Significantly, it was the National War Labor Board (NWLB), exer-
cising special wartime powers, rather than the NLRB, that put a stop
to this discriminatory practice.'0
Under the Wagner Act, the closed shop was expressly declared
to be legal." Throughout the period of World War II, however, the
type of union-security provision covering most workers was the main-
tenance-of-membership clause devised by the NWLB.' 2 This provision
preserved the right of employees to refuse to join the certified or
recognized union, and also allowed a fifteen-day "escape period" at
the expiration of the collective agreement, during which union mem-
bers could resign with impunity. Those workers who voluntarily joined
and remained in the union, however, were obligated to maintain their
membership in good standing as a condition of continued employment
for the life of the agreement.
With the passage in 1947 of the Labor Management Relations
Act,13 this era of voluntarism came to an end. The amended NLRA
outlawed the closed shop, but expressly authorized a form of union
shop that imposed substantially greater compulsions on employees in
the bargaining unit than the maintenance-of-membership provisions
had required. Under a lawfully executed union-shop agreement em-
ployees in the covered unit were compelled to join the union no later
than thirty days after being hired or after the effective date of the
agreement, whichever came later, as a condition of continued employ-
ment. This requirement was not binding, however, if the employee
was not offered membership "on the same terms and conditions gen-
erally applicable to other members." Moreover, no employee was re-
quired to "join" the union in the sense of "taking the obligation"; he
was simply required to "tender the periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship."' 4
10 See Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Tucson, Ariz.) and International Ass'n
of Machinists, 16 War Lab. Rep. 159 (1944).
11 Section 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
12 For a history of the development of this formula, see 1 NWLB Termination
Rep. ch. 7 (1946).
13 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68 (1958), commonly known as
the Taft-Hartley Act.
14 Section 3(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 61 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1958). As originally enacted, § 8(a) (3) also required that the union must
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In 1951 the Railway Labor Act was amended to legalize, for the
first time under that statute, union-security provisions substantially
similar to those authorized by the amended NLRA, but differing in
several material respects."6 The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) again amended the NLRA provi-
sions with respect to union security by permitting employers "engaged
primarily in the building and construction industry" to enter into
union-shop prehire agreements with unassisted building-trades unions,
without regard to their majority status. Under such agreements, em-
ployees must, as a condition of their employment, join the union
within seven days following the date of hire or the effective date of
the agreement, whichever is later. The other restrictions, described
above, are still applicable.16
Since 1947 the union shop has become by far the most common
type of union-security provision. Fairly administered, it represents
a reasonable compromise between those who resent being forced to
submit to the discipline of an organization whose views they disagree
with and do not wish to support, and those who are equally incensed
over the idea of letting the so-called "free riders" share the benefits
of union activity without contributing financially to its assistance.
Whenever a union abuses the powers that it derives from its status as
exclusive bargaining representative, however, the added obligations
enforced by a union-shop provision become that much more onerous
for those who are the objects of the union's unfair treatment, or who
oppose a particular union or unionism in general. In this sense only
does "compulsory unionism" become a distinguishable element in the
broader analysis of the union's duty of fair representation.
II. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEMS
The obvious cases of unfair treatment of employees by the ex-
clusive bargaining agent, as well as the various legal and equitable
remedies available to those employees who have been wronged, have
first have been authorized to negotiate such an agreement by a majority of employees
in the bargaining unit eligible to vote; but that clause was subsequently repealed.
15 Section 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958). The most
significant differences between the union-security provisions of the two statutes are
the inclusion of assessments (but not fines and penalties) in the permissible charges,
and a period of sixty (rather than thirty) days in which to join the union, under the
Railway Labor Act.
10 Section 705, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. I, 1959), adding § 8(f)
to the National Labor Relations Act.
17 See Theodore, "Union Security Provisions in Major Union Contracts, 1958-59,"
S2 Monthly Lab. Rev. 1348 (1959).
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been exhaustively considered by a number of authorities in this field.'"
The most difficult problems, however, are those which raise the ques-
tion whether there has in fact been a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. To what extent must individual demands yield to the will of
the majority? Are there some individual rights that must remain
immune to any sort of restriction, no matter how much they clash with
the union's institutional objectives? When, if ever, are the employer
and the union justified in overriding the wishes of an individual em-
ployee, or perhaps of a majority of employees, in the interest of
preserving and enhancing the collective bargaining relationship?
In this article we shall consider a few examples of the many cases
raising such questions in three general types of situations: (1) the
negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the administra-
tion of the agreement, specifically through the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure; and (3) the use by the union of members' dues and
initiation fees, obtained by virtue of a union-shop clause in the agree-
ment, for purposes not directly related to the subjects covered by the
agreement.
A. Negotiating the Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Most authorities have distinguished rather sharply between the
nature of the union's duty of fair representation in negotiating a collec-
tive agreement and the nature of that duty in handling grievances
arising out of the agreement once it has been negotiated. The reasons
why the union should be given a wider latitude of discretion in nego-
tiating an agreement were explicitly set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman."9 That decision upheld
the propriety of a negotiated change in a seniority provision granting
credit for military service prior to employment under the agreement,
although the result was to give some new employees more seniority
than others with longer service in the bargaining unit. In its unani-
mous opinion the Court flatly declared that the bargaining representa-
tive "is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of
all whom it represents."2 Since the interests of all employees are
18 See, for example, Aaron & Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Internal Union
Affairs," 44 Ill. L. Rev. 425, 631 (1949); Blumrosen, "Group Interests in Labor Law,"
13 Rutgers L. Rev. 432 (1959) ; Blumrosen, "Legal Protection for -Critical job Interests:
Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy," 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631
(1959); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956); Cox
"The Duty of Fair Representation," 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Summers, "Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis," N.Y.U. 12th Annual
Conference on Labor 63 (1959).
39 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
20 Id. at 338.
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not the same and, indeed, are often sharply in conflict, the Court's
uncompromising statement, standing alone, placed the union in the
rather sticky logical difficulty of maintaining complete loyalty to a
number of competing interests. Fortunately, the Court recognized
this problem, at least tacitly, by continuing in a somewhat more
reasonable vein:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reason-
ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion 2l
Adverting to the same problem facing a union when it negotiates a
collective agreement, Professor Summers has emphasized that the
final settlement comprises "a single package of assorted benefits which
are neither equal nor rational but which will meet the practical needs
of the parties and provide peace.... For the law to impose substantial
limits by inquiring closely into the fairness of the compromises would
hinder the parties in arriving at peaceful settlements. 22
Professor Summers and others holding similar views would be the
first to insist, of course, that a peaceful settlement, however desir-
able as an objective, cannot be regarded as the sole, or perhaps even
the decisive, criterion in determining the amount of leeway the union
should be allowed in negotiating a collective agreement. For example,
the agreement between the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, pursuant to
which Negro firemen were placed at the bottom of the seniority list,
may have promoted harmony between the contracting parties, but
it also constituted so egregious a violation of minority rights that it
could not be permitted to stand.
In the Steele case the United States Supreme Court emphasized
the duty of the statutory bargaining representative "to represent non-
union or minority union members . . . without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith." That duty, the Court said,
included an obligation "to consider requests of non-union members ...
and expressions of their views with respect to collective bargaining
with the employer and to give them notice of and opportunity for
hearing upon its proposed action. ' 23 In formulating their contract
21 Ibid.
22 Summers, supra note 18, at 71-72.
23 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., supra note 5, at 204.
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demands most unions satisfy this requirement with respect to their
own members; but it is doubtful that nonunion members in the bar-
gaining unit are often given much of an opportunity to be heard on
the merits of suggested contract proposals. This fact provides both a
reason why every employee in the bargaining unit should, in his own
self-interest, join the union representing him, and an argument against
allowing any union which arbitrarily and unreasonably excludes
qualified employees from membership to exercise the rights of exclusive
bargaining representation with respect to such employees.
When Congress adopted the LMRDA, it once again passed up the
opportunity to require in specific terms the admission on an equal
basis of all qualified bargaining-unit employees as a condition for
certification of a union as the exclusive bargaining representative.24
Nevertheless, there is still some room for argument that under section
101 (a) (1) of the new law qualified employees who are denied admis-
sion on an equal basis are entitled to "equal rights and privileges within
such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections and
referendums . . . to attend membership meetings, and to participate
in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings,
subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's
constitution and bylaws."25 This argument is based primarily on the
definition of "member," which is defined in section 3 (o) of the act as
follows:
"Member" or "member in good standing," when used in reference
to a labor organization, includes any person who has fulfilled the
requirements for membership in such organization, and who neither
has voluntarily withdrawn from membership nor has been expelled
or suspended from membership after appropriate proceedings con-
sistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of
such organization.
It also receives some slight support from the language of section 2,
setting forth the declaration of findings, purposes, and policy of the
act, which speaks only of "employees" and not of union members.26
Despite these faint glimmers of hope, however, the chances of qualified
employees who are unfairly denied union membership securing the
right to share equally in the normal rights and benefits of membership
must still be considered as remote.
The case of the employee who, though eligible for union mem-
24 See Aaron, "The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,"
73 Harv. L. Rev. 891, 860-61 (1960).
25 Id. at 862.
26 See Givens, "The Enfranchisement of Employees Arbitrarily Rejected for Union
Membership," 11 Lab. L.J. 809 (1960).
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bership, refuses to join is of an entirely different order. The problem
here is his problem, not the union's, and whether or not he is com-
pelled by a union-shop agreement to support the union is really irrele-
vant. If his views on important collective bargaining policies are not
considered simply because he will not attend union meetings, he is
hardly in a position to complain. His quarrel is really with the national
labor policy, which makes the union selected by the majority of
workers in the bargaining unit his exclusive representative, whether
he likes it or not.
Between the two extremes of the employee whom the union
wrongfully refuses to represent fairly and the employee who refuses
to give the union a chance to represent him fairly, lie the mass of cases,
typified by Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, in which the competing
equities are more closely in balance. Let us suppose a case in which
an employer has unilaterally established and maintained a contribu-
tory pension plan for his employees, who are unorganized. Under this
plan eligible employees have received pension benefits upon reaching
the retirement age of sixty-five. Many former employees have retired
under this plan; a substantial number of present employees will soon
be eligible to do so.
Now let us assume that a union enters the picture and is certified
as the exclusive bargaining representative. Thereafter, it negotiates
a collective agreement with the employer which provides, among other
things, for the abandonment of the pension plan in exchange for a
health and welfare plan financed wholly by the employer. Let us
assume further that this action was initiated by the union after a gen-
eral discussion of bargaining demands by a representative group of
bargaining-unit members; that it represented the wishes of most of the
younger workers, who constituted a slight majority; and that it was
bitterly opposed by most of the older workers, who constituted a sub-
stantial minority. Under these circumstances has the union fulfilled
or violated its duty of fair representation?
It is clear that the employer's acquiescence in the new arrange-
ment has no bearing on the union's obligation to the employees it
represents. We may also disregard the possible effects of the new
collective agreement on the rights of retired employees. Since those
employees are no longer members of the bargaining unit represented
by the union, it is unlikely that their rights are subject to modification
by the joint or individual actions of the union or the employer. 7 In
any event, the problem of retired employees is a peculiar aspect of our
27 Note, "Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification," 56 Colum. L. Rev.
251, 268 (1956).
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hypothetical fact situation and is not usually present in cases of the
general type under consideration.
At first blush, then, it would appear that our hypothetical prob-
lem falls comfortably within the rule of the Huffman case. Certainly,
in some respects pension provisions in collective agreements are quite
similar to seniority provisions: the life of any negotiated agreement
may be a short one, and the initial promise of benefits provided there-
under may never be fulfilled. Even though a pension plan or a seniority
system continues in effect, the parties may agree, from time to time, on
changes that reduce or alter the benefits that were previously provided
to some or all of the employees in the bargaining unit. In Huffman
the Supreme Court wisely recognized that possibility as a fact of
industrial life, and refused to set aside the new seniority agreement
negotiated by the union in the absence of a showing that the union had
acted in bad faith.
Yet even in seniority cases there are definite limitations on the
union's authority to modify the rights of individual employees under
existing provisions. Although seniority is not a property right that
exists independently of the collective agreement, seniority benefits
provided by the agreement have been denominated valuable property
rights which will be enforced.2 As one writer has observed:
The fundamental, distinction seems to be this: The union which
has authority to change the entire seniority structure has no
authority to act for an employee in waiving his rights to the
benefit of an existing bargain.... [However,] if the union deter-
mines, as a legislature might, that the interests of the bargaining
unit, considered as a whole, would be better served by a different
seniority arrangement, there is no impairment of the obligations
of any contract and no "vested rights" have been infringed.29
The underlying problem posed by our hypothetical case, there-
fore, is to determine the true nature of the union's action. Absent any
vesting provisions in the employer's unilateral pension plan, the agree-
ment to substitute the health and welfare plan would not appear to
abrogate "valuable property rights" of individual employees who had
not yet retired on pension. Suppose, however, that the employer had
no policy of compulsory retirement, and that some employees over the
age of sixty-five and with twenty-five or more years of credited service
were still working in the plant. It seems altogether likely that their
individual rights to the promised pension would receive judicial pro-
28 Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., & Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959).
29 Baker, Employee Rights Under Collectively Bargained Group Plans 8 (un-
published article in possession of this writer).
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tection.30 The case of employees who had twenty-five or more years
of credited service but who had not yet reached age sixty-five, though
not quite as strong, would also be likely to get a sympathetic hearing.
It is doubtful whether, in this type of situation, the rights of the
adversely affected older employees should be determined solely on the
basis of the promises initially made by the employer in his unilateral
pension plan. Professor Blumrosen's argument that "the requirements
implicit in our concepts of ordered liberty are now binding on union-
management joint action, even though, had management acted uni-
laterally, it would have been free to ignore the individual employee
interest,"' 31 may well be applicable here. Thus, even though the em-
ployer had expressly reserved the right "to change, amend or discon-
tinue the plan should future conditions in the judgment of the
Company warrant such action," and could have done so unilaterally,
he might well be prohibited from accomplishing the same result by
agreement with the union, perhaps on the ground that the entire
agreement is subject to the union's duty of fair representation.
The one reasonably definite conclusion that emerges from all this
hazy speculation is that the legality of the action taken by the em-
ployer and the union in our hypothetical case should not depend solely
on whether the union acted in good faith, any more than it should
depend solely upon whether the agreement fosters industrial peace.
Rather, it should rest upon a determination of the nature of the pen-
sion rights being abrogated. It would seem clear that if these rights
have already vested, they cannot be taken away or reduced. If
they are not vested rights, but only anticipated benefits, we must
consider whether they are entitled to protection against the adverse
interest of the majority.
It may be that in this kind of situation the union and the employer
should jointly be held accountable to the standards imposed, in some
jurisdictions, on governmental agencies. In holding invalid an attempt
by the City of Long Beach to amend its pension plan for firemen
and policemen, thereby reducing benefits, the California Supreme
Court declared that "vested contractual pension rights may be modified
prior to retirement" in order to maintain the integrity and flexibility
of the pension system, provided that such modifications are "reason-
able." It then elaborated:
30 See Vallejo v. American Railroad Co. of Porto Rico, 18 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.
1951).
31 Blumrosen, "Group Interests in Labor Law," 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 432, 483 (1959).
32 Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E2d 880
(1954).
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To be sustained as reasonable, alterations of employees' pension
rights must bear some material relation to the theory of a pension
system and its successful operation, and changes in a pension plan
which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied
by comparable new advantages. 33
There are obvious difficulties, however, in applying the suggested
analogy to the type of problem here considered. The relationship be-
tween a union and its members is quite different from that between
a governmental agency and its employees. Though unions have some-
times been likened to public utilities, they still have considerable
discretion in the formulation and administration of their own policies.
Given the complexity of union organization and the high incidence of
conflicting interests among union members, the above-quoted test
enunciated by the California Supreme Court seems too rigid to be
applied to unions. Perhaps at this stage we are not ready to devise
a general standard, and it may be best to rely upon the ad hoc judg-
ments of the courts, based on the equities of the individual case.
B. Administering the Agreement
It is generally agreed that, with respect to the rights of their
individual members, unions have a much more limited area of discre-
tion in administering an existing collective agreement than in negotiat-
ing a new one; the question is, how much discretion do they have,
assuming always that it is exercised in good faith?
As in the case of negotiating the agreement, there are very clear
instances of justified and unjustified conduct that we need only identify
in passing. In the first category are those cases in which the respon-
sible union officers, having carefully and fully investigated the facts
of a grievance, conclude in good faith that the grievant is in the wrong
and decline to process the matter further.34 At this point the union's
duty of fair representation has been satisfied; whether the employee
involved should then have recourse to individual action is another
question and not within the scope of this article.3 5 In the second cate-
gory are those instances of patent discrimination, often covert, against
nonmembers in the bargaining unit, of which several examples have
previously been cited. The great majority of cases again fall midway
33 Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (1955).
34 0strofsky v. United Steelworkers, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960).
3L Differing views on this subject are expressed in A.B.A. Report on Individual
Grievances, reprinted in S0 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143 (1955); Blumrosen, "Legal Protection for
Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy," 13
Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 653-57 (1959); Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective
Bargaining Agreements," 8 Lab. L.J. 850, 858-59 (1957).
1961]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
between these extremes. From the wealth of examples we shall select
only two for discussion.
In Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp.,36 a dispute arose over the meaning
of a seniority clause in an existing collective agreement. The company
demoted and transferred back to the bargaining unit a number of
supervisors who had originally been promoted out of the bargaining
unit. The question was whether these employees had accumulated
bargaining-unit seniority during their period of service as supervisors.
The company took the position that they had; consequently, it per-
mitted the demoted supervisors to "bump" less senior employees in
the bargaining unit, with the result that four of the latter group were
laid off. The union, claiming that the former supervisors had not
accumulated seniority during their period of service outside the
bargaining unit, appealed the grievance of the employees who had been
laid off to arbitration.
The arbitration proceeding was conducted in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in the collective agreement. Both parties were
represented by counsel. The arbitrator received evidence and heard
witnesses; counsel submitted oral arguments and post-hearing briefs.
There was just one hitch: none of the demoted supervisors was notified
of the time and place of the hearing and none was present or partici-
pated in the proceeding. Thereafter, the arbitrator ruled in the union's
favor on all counts. He held that under the agreement employees
could not accumulate seniority while working outside the bargaining
unit, and he ordered the reinstatement with back pay of the employees
who had been laid off. After the company had complied with the
award, seventeen of the twenty-nine former supervisors adversely
affected thereby filed a suit in the state court to have the award nul-
lified and to restrain the company and union from applying it to the
plaintiffs. Judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, principally on the ground that the plaintiffs
had been denied notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard.
Conceding that the plaintiffs' views were the same as those presented
by the employer to the arbitrator, the court said: "Employees not
fairly represented by the union should never be put in the position of
having to solely depend upon the employer's championing their rights
under the collective-bargaining contract. '3 7 As the court viewed the
situation:
where the interests of two groups of employees are diametrically
opposed to each other and the union espouses the cause of one in
the arbitration, it follows as a matter of law that there has been no
S6 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960).
37 8 Wis. 2d 264, at 275, 99 N.W.2d 132, at 138.
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fair representation of the other group. This is true even though,
in choosing the cause . . . to espouse, the union acts completely
objectively and with the best of motives. The old adage, that one
cannot serve two masters, is particularly applicable to such a
situation.A8
The decision in the Hein-Werner case is subject to criticism on
a variety of grounds. There was ample evidence in the record that
the plaintiffs had full knowledge that the arbitration would take place,
even though they received no formal notice as to time and place, and
there was no indication that they sought to intervene. Indeed, the sole
basis for the suit, resolutely ignored by both the trial and the appellate
courts, was that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. Moreover,
it appears that the plaintiffs' seniority claims were ably presented by
counsel for the employer, who took the same position. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court's generalization, that employees not fairly represented
by the union ought never to have to rely solely upon the employer to
protect their rights under the collective agreement, lacks persuasive-
ness when applied to the facts of this case. The most interesting, as
well as the most controversial, aspect of the decision, however, is the
court's statement, quoted above, that the union had failed, "as a matter
of law," fairly to represent the demoted supervisors because it argued
against their position in the arbitration. The effect of this dictum is to
neutralize the union on every question of contract interpretation con-
cerning which the opinion of its membership is not unanimous-that
is to say, on almost every issue. One would be hard put to find a better
recipe for undermining union responsibility and promoting general
anarchy within the plant community.
The court fell into error by treating the union's right to exercise
its institutional judgment as nothing but the obverse of the individual
employee's right to due process, whereas the two are separate, though
related, concepts. In deciding in good faith, after full consideration
of the competing equities, to argue that the seniority provision in the
agreement did not permit employees to accumulate seniority while
working outside the bargaining unit, the union did not violate its duty
of fair representation toward those employees who urged the opposite
interpretation. On the other hand, there is considerable merit to the
contention that those employees adversely affected by the union's
position were entitled to notice of and separate representation at the
arbitration hearing. In the Hein-Werner case it appears that the
plaintiffs did have notice of the hearing and that their own views were
presented adequately; but even if we assume the contrary, it is incor-
38 8 Wis. 2d 264, at 272, 99 N.W.2d 132, at 137. Emphasis added.
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rect to conclude that the union was under a duty to present their side
of the dispute.
Although the decision in the Hein-Werner case is wrong, it calls
attention to an important truth that is frequently overlooked, namely,
that some individual rights worthy of protection cannot adequately
be preserved simply by invoking the concept of the union's duty of
fair representation. Fair representation does not imply strict neu-
trality; the union has the right and the duty to take a position on
disputed issues involving the administration of the collective agree-
ment. If that position, which represents a good-faith judgment on
the union's part, adversely affects what Professor Blumrosen has called
the "critical job interests ' 39 of some bargaining-unit employees, they
may be entitled to separate representation in presenting a grievance to
the employer or to an arbitrator. The task of determining which job
interests are "critical" is not an easy one; perhaps, like the problem
discussed in the previous section of this article, it must be dealt with
on an ad hoc basis. The point to be emphasized is that this right, to
the extent that it exists, is something different from and in addition
to the right of fair representation by the union.
By way of contrast, let us now consider a case in which the
protection of employees' critical job interests was complicated by the
rather obvious failure of the union to observe its duty of fair repre-
sentation. In Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., the employer had a col-
lective bargaining agreement with a local of the Jewelry Workers
Union. Some of the employees in the bargaining unit became dissatis-
fied with the union's administration of the agreement and apparently
encouraged a local of the Teamsters Union in its efforts to supplant
the Jewelry Workers as the bargaining representative of the unit. At
one point the Teamsters called a strike and picketed the Lenscraft
plant. In a successful suit to enjoin the picketing the employer was
represented by the attorney for the Jewelry Workers. Following the
injunction, Lenscraft discharged seven of its employees for allegedly
engaging in a slowdown. They filed a grievance, which the union
(Jewelry Workers) carried to arbitration.
About two hours before the arbitration hearing was scheduled to
begin, the employer delivered letters to the grievants, informing them
of the time and place of the hearing, ostensibly in order that they
might appear and be heard. The grievants showed up with their own
attorney, who was also attorney for the Teamsters local that had
tried to take over the Lenscraft unit. Counsel for the jewelry Workers,
who was presenting the union's case on behalf of the grievants, was
the same attorney who had obtained the injunction for the employer
39 Blumrosen, supra note 35.
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against the Teamsters. The grievants' attorney asked for and obtained
a continuance, and the arbitrator took under advisement his request to
represent the grievants in the arbitration, on the ground that the
Jewelry Workers' attorney was obviously biased against his clients.
Before resuming the hearing, the arbitrator denied the request, and
the grievants voluntarily elected not to appear. Counsel for the Jewelry
Workers interposed no defense on behalf of the grievants, and their
discharges were upheld by the arbitrator.
The grievants then brought suit to vacate the arbitrator's award.
A decision in their favor40 was affirmed by the appellate division of the
New York Supreme Court,41 which held that "enough was shown to
negative the possibility of fair representation of the interests of peti-
tioners by Local 122 ' " of the Jewelry Workers, and that the grievants
should therefore have been permitted to be represented by their own
counsel. On appeal, the decision was reversed,43 on the dubious ground
that the grievants were not legal parties to the arbitration and had no
standing to challenge the award.
In terms of the role played by the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, the differences between the Hein-Werner and the Lenscraft cases
are at once apparent. In the former case the union openly took sides
in the controversy between two groups of its members and elected to
support one group against the other; in the latter case the union
purported to represent the interests of its seven aggrieved members
when in fact it was acting in collusion with the employer to secure
their discharge. From the reported facts of the Lenscraft case one gets
the strong impression that the grievants were openly promoting dual
unionism, which is universally regarded as treason in the union move-
ment. The Jewelry Workers might well have been justified, therefore,
in refusing to process the grievance, leaving the grievants to pursue
such other legal or equitable remedies as were available. As previously
suggested, whatever relief they might thus have obtained could not
properly have been predicated on the union's failure to represent them
fairly, but only on the theory that they could not be discharged with-
out an opportunity to present evidence and argument in their own
behalf to a neutral third party. Instead of refusing to process the
grievance, however, the union pretended to represent the grievants,
with the result that the arbitration case was not fairly presented on
the merits. This, clearly, was a violation of the union's duty of fair
representation.
40 Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 137 N.Y.L.J. 6 (Apr. 12, 1957).
41 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S.2d 388.
42 7 App. Div. 2d 1 at 6, ISO N.Y.S.2d 388, at 393.
43 Matter of Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855 (1960).
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The Hein-Werner and Lenscraft decisions are especially regret-
table, not only because, in this writer's opinion, they were wrongly
decided and have created harmful precedents, but also because the
same results might have been obtained under proper procedures. Had
the Hein-Werner supervisors been permitted to appear in the arbitra-
tion hearing and to supplement the employer's case with arguments in
their own behalf, there would have been no denial of due process and
the arbitrator's decision would almost certainly have been the same.
Similarly, in the Lenscraft case, if the union had participated in the
arbitration only as an observer and if the grievants had been treated
as the real parties to the dispute with the employer, there is a good
chance that the discharges would still have been sustained.
C. The Use of Compulsory Union Dues and Initiation Fees for
Political Purposes
We come finally to the third, and in many ways the most interest-
ing, type of situation discussed in this article. As mentioned earlier, the
NLRA, as amended, authorizes a limited form of union security,
under which all members of the bargaining unit must contribute to
the support of the union by tendering a uniform initiation fee and
periodic dues payments. The act also provides, however, that noth-
ing therein "shall be construed as authorizing the execution or appli-
cation of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by . .. law." 4
Unlike the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act contains no provision
exalting state or territorial law over the federal statute in respect to
union security; on the contrary, section 2, eleventh, expressly permits
execution of the prescribed form of union-security agreement "not-
withstanding . . . any other statute or law of the United States, or
Territory thereof, or of any State." The constitutionality of this section
was unanimously upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 5 which involved a con-
flict between that section and the "right-to-work" provision of the
Nebraska constitution.
In discussing the issues raised in the Hanson case Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that "to require,
rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute
to its costs may not be the wisest course." He added, however, that
Congress had attempted no more than to "help insure the right to work
44 Section 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
45 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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in and along the arteries of interstate commerce." 6 Noting that the
only conditions to union membership authorized by this section
are the payment of periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments, he
observed that the financial support required "relates ... to the work
of the union in the realm of collective bargaining," and that "no more
precise allocation of union overhead to individual members seems to
us to be necessary.14 7
The Justice then turned to the argument that "the union shop
agreement forces men into ideological and political associations which
violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association,
and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights.14 Although
he found no evidence in the record of any substantial impairment or
infringement of first amendment rights, Mr. Justice Douglas added:
".... if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a
cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contraven-
tion of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the
decision in that case."4 9 Thus, the Court specifically reserved for
future decision the problem which we shall now consider.
In 1953 the Georgia Southern & Florida Railway entered into
union-shop agreements of the type permitted by the amended Railway
Labor Act with the International Association of Machinists and vari-
ous other unions. Subsequently, a group of employees who objected
to joining the union brought an action against Georgia Southern and
eight other railroads and terminal companies, the Machinists and
thirteen other labor organizations, and a large number of individual
defendants to enjoin enforcement of the union-shop agreements and to
have them declared null and void. The petitioners alleged, among other
things, that the initiation fees, periodic dues, and assessments which
they would be required to pay under the union-shop provision would
be used "in substantial part for purposes not germane to collective
bargaining but to support ideological and political doctrines and
candidates" to whom they were opposed. After granting a temporary
injunction, the trial court subsequently dissolved the injunction and
sustained the motion filed on behalf of the defendant unions to dis-
miss the action against all defendants. The petitioners then appealed
to the Georgia Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the
court below."0 The appellate tribunal's unanimous opinion stated in
part: "We do not believe one can constitutionally be compelled to
46 Id. at 235.
47 Ibid.
48 Id. at 236.
49 Id. at 238.
50 Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957).
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contribute money to support ideas, politics and candidates which he
opposes. We believe his right to immunity from such exactions is
superior to any claim the union can make upon him." 1
The case was remanded to the superior court of Bibb County,
Georgia, where it was tried without a jury on a stipulated set of
facts, on the basis of which the trial court found and concluded in part:
(5) The funds so exacted from plaintiffs and the class they
represent by the labor union defendants have been, and are being,
used in substantial amounts by the latter to support the political
campaigns of candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President of the United States, and for the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States, opposed by plaintiffs and
the class they represent, and also to support by direct and indirect
financial contributions and expenditures the political campaigns
of candidates for State and local public offices, opposed by
plaintiffs and the class they represent ...
(6) Those funds have been and are being used in substantial
amounts to propagate political and economic doctrines, concepts
and ideologies and to promote legislative programs opposed by
plaintiffs and the class they represent... [and] also ... to impose
upon plaintiffs and the class they represent, as well as upon the
general public, conformity to those doctrines, concepts, ideologies
and programs.
(7) The exaction of moneys from plaintiffs and the class they
represent for the purposes and activities described above is not
reasonably necessary to collective bargaining or to maintaining the
existence and position of said union defendants as effective bar-
gaining agents or to inform the employees whom said defendants
represent of developments of mutual interest ....
(10) The labor union defendants, by their commingling of
funds used for collective bargaining purposes and activities and
those used for the complained of purposes and activities set forth
above have made it impossible to segregate the amount of dues
collected from plaintiffs and the class they represent which are and
will be used for collective bargaining purposes from those which
are and will be used for the complained of purposes and activities
set forth above.52
On the basis of these and other findings and conclusions, the
trial court declared section 2, eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act
unconstitutional, "to the extent that it . . . is applied to permit the
exaction of funds from plaintiffs and the class they represent for the
complained of purposes and activities"; it also declared the union-
shop agreements null and void, permanently enjoined their enforce-
ment, and ordered the return of paid-in dues, initiation fees, and as-
51 213 Ga. 279, at 284-85, 99 S.E.2d 101, at 105.
52 Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry., 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,463, 65,466-67
(Ga. Super. Ct., Bibb Co., Nov. 21, 1958).
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sessments to certain individual plaintiffs.53 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed, 54 and the case was then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.55
As of the time this article is written, the Court has not decided
the Street case. If it follows the suggestion of the Department of
Justice, it will uphold the constitutionality of this section and
of union-shop agreements made thereunder, but will not rule on the
propriety of the union political expenditures complained of in the suit.
In its brief supporting this position the Department states:
We submit that appellees have other remedies-either on remand,
together with amendment of the complaint and prayer to enjoin
use of monies paid by them for the purposes to which they object,
or in a new suit-if they desire to test the validity of the expendi-
tures they attack.56
Noting that appellees have never recognized any distinction be-
tween union expenditures for such varied purposes as testimony before
legislative committees, donations to political campaigns, support of
wage and hour legislation, and support of farm legislation, between
expenditures by the appellant unions and expenditures by the AFL-
CIO, or between advocacy of ideas and candidates by a newspaper
supported by subscriptions and such advocacy by journals supported
directly out of general dues funds, the Department argues that these
several activities "involve many differing considerations, and probably
should not be treated in one basket for analytical or constitutional
purposes.157 At the same time, the Department takes the position that:
unions do have a responsibility toward dissenting members in
taking "political" action, and on a proper record and a proper
request for relief, either on remand in the present case or in a new
action, it may be that certain of the appellants' expenditures will
be found to be illegal as to the appellees and those they represent.58
The argument for remand or dismissal of the action in the Street
case on the grounds urged by the Department is persuasive; but sooner
53 Id. at 65,467-68.
54 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
55 The Court, having noted probable jurisdiction, 361 U.S. 807 (1959), heard
argument on April 21, 1960; it later certified to the Attorney General that the consti-
tutionality of the Railway Labor Act had been drawn in question, and set the case for
reargument. 363 U.S. 825 (1960). Subsequently, the Court granted the Government's
petition to intervene. 29 U.S.L. Week 3101 (Oct. 11, 1960). Reargument was heard on
Jan. 17, 1961.
56 Quoted in Bureau of Natl Affairs, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 231, Nov. 29, 1960, p.
A-2.
57 Id. at A-3; see also Daily Lab. Rep. No. 11, Jan. 17, 1961, p. A-9.
58 Daily Lab. Rep. No. 231, Nov. 29, 1960, p. A-2.
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or later the Court will have to deal with the challenge to union political
expenditures of the type there involved on its merits. Accordingly, we
shall discuss this aspect of the Street case as if it were properly before
the Court for decision.
In his opinion in Hanson, Justice Douglas compared the alleged
infringement or impairment of the "first amendment rights" of
employees covered by a union-shop clause, who did not wish to join
the union with "the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be
a member of an integrated bar."5 The appellees in the Street case
argue, however, that the integrated bar case is distinguishable on many
factual and legal grounds, the principal ones being that the expenditure
of integrated bar funds is supervised by the state court and that the
integrated bar is a governmental, rather than a private, organization. 0
The similarities and differences between compulsory membership
in a union and compulsory membership in an integrated bar are high-
lighted by the decision in Lathrop v. Donohue,6 involving a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin integrated bar. The com-
plaints in both the Lathrop and Street cases are similar. Thus, in
Lathrop the plaintiff bases his argument that compulsory dues of the
state bar infringe upon first amendment freedoms on the ground that
the state bar takes a stand on pending legislation, and that "part of his
dues money is used to support causes to which he is opposed."62 The
cases are at least formally distinguishable, on the other hand, because
all activities engaged in by the state bar in the legislative field are
limited by its rules and bylaws, which are promulgated by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court. According to the opinion in the Lathrop case, the
Wisconsin court:
has determined that it promotes the public interest to have public
expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state,
with respect to legislation affecting the administration of justice
and the practice of law . . . voiced through their own democrati-
cally chosen representatives comprising the board of governors
of the State Bar [and that] the public interest so promoted far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to the plaintiff resulting from
his required payment of the annual dues.63
These revealing observations suggest that the distinctions be-
tween the Street and Lathrop cases are more apparent than real. In
both, the complaint is against being compelled to contribute money
59 Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
60 Brief upon Reargument for Appellees, p. 17.
61 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960), appeal filed June 30, 1960 (No. 200),
29 U.S.L. Week 3039 (Aug. 2, 1960).
62 10 Wis. 2d 230, at -, 102 N.W.2d at 409.
63 10 Wis. 2d 230, at -, 102 N.W.2d at 404, 411.
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that will be used to support causes opposed by the contributor; and
it is this element of compulsion that is the real common denominator.
Surely, a distinction between the two cases cannot be predicated on
the unproved assumption that integrated bar funds are spent more
wisely or for worthier purposes than are union funds, or that opposi-
tion to such expenditures is reasonable in the Street case but unreason-
able in the Lathrop case. On the contrary, the element of economic
compulsion and, for all we know, the sense of moral outrage in those
subject to it are the same in both cases; and what the Georgia court
denounces as an unconstitutional invasion of individual rights is dis-
missed by the Wisconsin court as a "slight inconvenience."
The integrated bar case thus provides an apt statutory analogy
to the problem raised in the Street case. For an analogy from the
common law we can turn to the celebrated litigation between the late
Cecil B. De Mille and the American Federation of Radio Artists
(AFRA) .4
De Mille was expelled by AFRA for refusing to pay a compulsory
assessment of one dollar per member levied in conformity with the
union's constitution and bylaws, for the purpose of fighting a proposed
"open-shop" amendment (Proposition No. 12) to the California
constitution. Like the appellees in the Street case, DeMille opposed
the purpose for which this money was spent, and argued that the levy
infringed his constitutional rights of suffrage, freedom of speech, and
assembly. It will be useful, therefore, to review the unanimous deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court, sustaining the dismissal of his
action, and to determine which of its conclusions, if any, are equally
applicable in the Street case.
In De Mille, the court found that AFRA was pursuing a legal
objective in seeking to defeat the "open-shop" amendment. From this
it followed that, "acting in conformity with the will of the majority
of its members," AFRA had a right "to devote its funds to any purpose
calculated to promote the objects of the association."0 5 The same
reasoning would seem to apply in the Street case. The union expendi-
tures complained of by the appellees are not illegal, and one may rea-
sonably infer that the money has been spent with the approval of a
majority of the contributing employees. On these points, therefore, the
two cases are indistinguishable.
De Mille was covered by a union-shop agreement and was com-
pelled by its terms to join the Los Angeles local of AFRA in order to
continue producing a radio program over the Columbia network.
04 De Mile v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769
(1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947).
65 31 Cal. 2d 139, at 146, 187 P.2d 769, at 774.
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AFRA's constitution provided that initiation fees, dues, and assess-
ments were to be fixed by the local unions for all of their members.
What was required by the union's constitution in the De Mille case
was permitted in all material respects by the Railway Labor Act
in the Street case; the court found no violation of the union's constitu-
tional rules or procedures in the one, and, similarly, there has been no
proven breach of either the statutory requirements or the union's rules
in the other.
De Mille did not contend that he was prevented from voting as he
pleased at the polls or from expressing publicly or privately his support
of the "open-shop" amendment. Nevertheless, he argued that:
to compel appellant to put his hand in his pocket and to give
money to AFRA leaders to be used to oppose Proposition No. 12
* . .when he was unwilling to oppose it .. .compelled appellant
to give expression to sentiments and to act contrary to his senti-
ments and to his thoughts, and ... to his opinion.... The giving
of money ... was more eloquent than the use of actual words.66
The complaint is the same in Street, and like the appellees in that
case,67 De Mille also sought to draw an analogy between his predica-
ment and that of the plaintiffs in the flag salute cases," in which it
was ultimately held that the required ritual constituted a compulsory
personal expression contrary to the plaintiffs' religious tenets.
The California court thought the analogy was inapposite, how-
ever, because it was based on two erroneous assumptions: first, that
De Mille's compulsory contribution to the union fund would be a
personal endorsement by him of opposition to Proposition No. 12;
and second, that the employment by AFRA of the assessment fund to
defeat the proposed amendment would be a use of his money for that
purpose. These assumptions, said the court, ignored the basic distinc-
tion between the union member and his organization. The latter, both
structurally and functionally, "is an institution which involves more
than the private or personal interests of its members." The assessments
contributed by the members became the property of AFRA, "and any
several or individual interest therein cease[d] upon such payment.169
This analysis is equally applicable to the facts of the Street case.
The crucial test, it would seem, is whether the union has the legal right
to expend its own funds for the purposes in question; if it does, the
66 31 Cal. 2d 139, at 148, 187 P.2d 769, at 775.
67 Brief upon Reargument for Appellees, pp. 36, 41.
68 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
69 De Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 149, 187 P.2d
769, 776 (1947).
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fact that some or all of those funds are made up of individual contri-
butions of union members is irrelevant.
It will be recalled that the Government's brief in the Street case
suggested the possibility that, on a proper record, "certain of the ap-
pellants' [unions']' expenditures will be found to be illegal as to the
appellees and those they represent. '7 ° Conceivably, the Solicitor
General had in mind the possible violation of section 501 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which reads in
part:
(a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representa-
tives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation
to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore,
the duty of each such person, taking into account the special
problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money
and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its
members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accord-
ance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the
governing bodies adopted thereunder .... A general exculpatory
provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organiza-
tion or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body
purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the
duties declared by this section shall be void as against public
policy.
A review of the legislative history of the LMRDA justifies the
prediction that the unions' political expenditures complained of in
the Street case are not likely to be held to violate section 501. In the
first place, specific proposals to outlaw exactly those types of levies
and expenditures, though included in both the Barden and the Mc-
Clellan bills submitted to the Eighty-Sixth Congress, 1 were omitted
from the statute as enacted. The lack of a similar provision in the
bill passed by the Senate was specifically cited in the minority report
filed by Senators Goldwater and Dirksen,72 and during the Senate
debate Senator Goldwater reviewed in considerable detail the back-
ground facts of the Street case. 3 In the House debates the same
criticisms were voiced by Representative Hoffman74 while Representa-
tive Griffin, characterizing his own bill as a "minimum bill," pointed
out that "there is nothing [in it] dealing directly with the use of
union dues for political activities."75
70 See supra note 28.
71 H.R. 4473, 86th Cong, 1st Sess. § 204 (1959) (Barden); S. 1137, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 412 (1959) (McClellan).
72 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-87 (1959).
73 105 Cong. Rec. 9119-21 (daily ed. June 8, 1959); see also id. at 12154-56 (daily
ed. July 14, 1959).
74 Id. at 14190-91 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959).
75 Id. at 14199 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959).
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In the second place, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that the expenditures of union funds in Street were not "solely for
the benefit" of the organization and their members. By enacting the
LMRDA Congress demonstrated beyond dispute that the most vital
interests of unions and their members are not limited to the context
of collective bargaining, but extend into the political arena. The wel-
fare of organized labor is affected, not only by so-called "labor legisla-
tion," but also by executive, legislative, and judicial decisions with
respect to monetary and fiscal policy, defense, education, health, and
many other issues. Finally, policies are made by men, and it is sheer
sophistry to argue that although a union may legitimately support
certain legislative objectives, it may not spend its funds to secure the
election of candidates whom it hopes or has reason to believe will
work to achieve labor's goals.
In dealing with the problem presented by the Street case, it is
not enough, however, to show simply that the unions' actions giving
rise to the suit do not invade constitutional rights or violate the statu-
tory or common law; the question whether they do violence to our
conception of the union's duty of fair representation remains. It is not
difficult to think of cases in which a union's political expenditures may
be intended to serve the personal interests of a few people, rather than
to promote the welfare of union members or of labor generally; yet the
number of such instances is probably not very great. Most union
constitutions and bylaws insure that members who are sufficiently in-
terested to attend meetings and vote will have an active voice in
determining how the organization's money should be spent, and title
I of the LMRDA guarantees that right.
The furor over the Street case should not be permitted to obscure
the fact that the right of individual dissent has not been impaired.
There is no evidence that the "exaction of dues, initiation fees, or
assessments is [being] used as a cover for forcing ideological con-
formity. 1 6 The appellees in that case are free to spend their time and
money in open support of causes and candidates opposed by their
unions. So long as that recourse remains open to them, we need not
be seriously concerned about the possible loss of individual freedom.
It would seem, therefore, that so long as the union observes its
own constitution and bylaws, carries out its normal collective bargain-
ing obligations, and does not seek to prevent its members from exer-
cising their rights as citizens, it violates no duty of fair representation
76 Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, supra note 59, at 238. A more serious
problem in this regard is raised by the decision in Mitchell v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 39 CCH Lab. Cas. 69,715 (Cal. Super. t., Mar. 9, 1960), which upheld
the expulsion, for "disloyalty," of union members advocating right-to-work legislation.
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by advocating political measures and supporting candidates for office
against the wishes of some of its members. To return to our original
thesis, the union's duty of fair representation arises out of the collec-
tive bargaining relationship; and provided that it faithfully carries
out its obligations in that sphere, it should be permitted to pursue in
good faith, and in accordance with its own rules and the existing law,
its institutional objectives in the broader areas of local and national
politics, regardless of whether those objectives are opposed by some
of its members.
III. CONCLUSION
The first two problems we have considered are among the most
perplexing in the field of labor law. This is so because they involve a
direct and often irreconcilable conflict between the union's institutional
objectives and the rights and interests of its individual members. The
key to their solution is not to be found in absolute principles, nor do
they fit easily into the framework of generalization. The examples we
have discussed under the headings of negotiating and administering
collective agreements suggest that decisions are more likely to turn
upon the facts of a given case than upon the application of an es-
tablished rule of law.
The third problem--expenditure of compulsory union dues and
initiation fees for political purposes-is perhaps of greater concern
to the general public than the other two; yet in its present context
it seems, at least to this writer, to raise the least difficult questions. Its
apparent complexity results from the tendency to look at it, so to
speak, through a faulty lens, which magnifies the aspect of a com-
pulsory tax for an undesired purpose, but obscures the aspect of free-
dom to dissent and to work for the opposing cause. Yet the problem
seldom involves an infringement of established individual rights, either
those guaranteed by the Constitution or by statutory law or those
created by a private collective agreement. Stripped of all its disguises,
the Street case thus emerges as simply another attack on the validity
of the union shop; and the issues it raises are neither novel nor
particularly significant.
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